

TOP SECRET

10 July 1965

25X1



Copy No. C 143

25X1



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

25X1



GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRET

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008400080001-0

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008400080001-0

10 July 1965

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

C O N T E N T S

25X1

- [REDACTED]
2. Dominican Republic: Dissension increases in rebel camp. (Page 4)
 3. USSR-UK: Kosygin reopens question of visit with Wilson. (Page 5)
 4. Algeria: Boumedienne's regime shows no more capacity to run the country than Ben Bella's. (Page 6)
 5. Common Market: The new financing proposals are conciliatory to the French but probably will not end the current crisis. (Page 7)

25X1

6. Notes: [REDACTED] Portugal; Ecuador. (Page 9)

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008400080001-0

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008400080001-0

*Dominican Republic: Dissension is increasing within the rebel camp.

The difficulties encountered by pro-Bosch forces in gaining acceptance of Garcia Godoy as provisional president illustrate the sharp divisions within the rebel movement. During the military phase of the rebellion the various rebel elements shared a common short term goal--destruction of the old order. As the political phase began, however, and negotiations appeared to be nearing a settlement, these groups and individuals have separated over how best to ensure their own future viability.

The majority decision on 8 July by the rebels to accept Garcia Godoy was reportedly reached only after Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party threatened to withdraw from the rebel movement. Bosch had earlier warned that "agent provocateurs, especially in the Fourteenth of June Political Group (APCJ), are placed in positions to create incidents" with the Inter-American Peace Force.

[The pro-Castro APCJ, which controls a sizable share of the rebel commando units, has said it will continue fighting no matter what Caamano decided to do. Trouble between the APCJ and the more moderate rebels has increased as the hard-line faction of the party, led by Fidelio Despradel Roque, has assumed greater control of the APCJ.]

25X1

10 July 65

4

USSR-UK: [Premier Kosygin has reopened the question of an exchange of visits with Prime Minister Wilson.]

[Soviet Ambassador Soldatov delivered a letter on the subject from Kosygin to Wilson on 6 July. According to Wilson, the letter specified no dates and, in fact, questioned whether a visit by Kosygin would be "useful" as long as there was such a "wide gap" between the British and Soviet positions on Vietnam and nuclear proliferation. However, Soldatov replied in the negative to Wilson's query whether this was a polite way of saying the visit was off.]

[Kosygin's demarche appears to be strictly a Soviet initiative. British Embassy officials in Moscow have remarked that it was "spontaneous" because the visit question has not been raised recently by the British.]

[By this gesture, Moscow may be trying to soften the Soviet rejection of the Commonwealth Peace Mission and at the same time hold open a potential channel for high-level contact with the West.]

[Although Wilson is clearly interested in Kosygin's overture, he has stated that he does not intend to reply before the end of August and he did not think any visit would take place before the West German elections in the fall.]

25X1

10 July 65

5

11772
The new government announced on 10 June, and apparently responsible only to the Revolutionary Council, has few significant changes from Ben Bella's. There is no reason for believing that its ministers can correct the mismanagement that all but paralyzed the Ben Bella regime, despite Boumedienne's assurances that this will be done.

Algeria: Colonel Boumedienne's regime so far has shown no more capacity to run the country than did Ben Bella's.

Ambassador Porter in Algiers reports that the 26-man National Council of the Revolution, announced on 5 July, "revealed a remarkably featureless face." Although the council can probably maintain control--it represents most of the military firepower in the country--none of the "historic chiefs" of the Algerian revolution still available is represented. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] Boumedienne earnestly tried to persuade some of them to lend the prestige of their names, but they set too high a price for their participation.]

see insert
Porter points out that the council is bound by no law, and has no traditions or institutions to guide or contain it. [Furthermore, while promising to correct the mismanagement of the Ben Bella era, the regime has mostly the same men--notably the ministers of foreign affairs, economics and industry, and agriculture--in exactly the same functions. None has yet shown any indication that he knows what must be done differently.]

Public support of the regime has so far been cool. Because he lacks a political following of his own, Boumedienne may find it more difficult than his predecessor to deal with future pressure to meet public needs and improve the stagnant economy. [redacted]

25X1

10 July 65

6

Common Market: [The new financing proposals reportedly being drafted by the EEC Commission are conciliatory to the French but appear to hold little promise of ending the current crisis.]

[As described by Commissioner Mansholt, the proposals would delay until 1970 the completion of both the common agricultural policy and the industrial customs union. Interim financing would be provided, pending final decisions on the issue of providing the community with its own financial resources and on the nature of European parliamentary control.]

[All the member states are likely to have difficulties with various aspects of the revised proposals and it is in any case questionable whether the French will deal with the commission. Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak has stated he believes France would refuse to accept a new proposal emanating from the commission. The proposal described by Mansholt is designed in part to determine if any basis remains for a compromise.]

[De Gaulle's economic and financial adviser, Jean Dromer, has emphasized to the US Embassy French antipathy to the commission, and he stated that President Hallstein "was probably through." Hallstein's speech in Germany on 8 July in which he strongly defended the role of the commission and denied the possibility of a "hegemonial role" for any state in Europe today, is likely to have further offended the French. There is already speculation that Hallstein could become the major target of French attack when the new, unified commission is chosen early next year.]

(continued)

10 July 65

7

[There are signs of growing uneasiness among French economic interests. Dromer himself noted fears of a possible investment crisis due to uncertainty over the Common Market's future. The US Embassy comments that the government's newly announced measures to satisfy French farmers will prove very expensive to the French treasury and harmful, if not disastrous, to the stabilization plan unless Paris gets "satisfactory" EEC financial arrangements by 1967.]


25X1

10 July 65

8

NOTES

25X1



25X1

Portugal: Initial delivery apparently has begun of the 20 B-26 aircraft which Portugal is reported to have purchased recently from a private US firm. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] four or five B-26s had arrived at Tancos Air Base near Lisbon as of 1 July, [redacted]

25X1


[redacted] The planes are intended for use in Portuguese Africa, but [redacted]

25X1

25X1

[redacted] Lisbon will probably wait until all 20 planes have arrived before sending any of them on to Africa.]

25X1



10 July 65

9

*Ecuador: Minor antiregime disturbances in Guayaquil and Quito ^{this week} yesterday were quickly controlled by police and troops. Sunday, which will be the second anniversary of the military coup, may provide another occasion for opposition efforts to threaten public order. The armed forces apparently continue to support the government and can be expected to contain acts of violence. [redacted]

25X1

in the immediate future.

10 July 65

10

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008400080001-0

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A008400080001-0

~~TOP SECRET~~